Abstract. The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for twoperson games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by c o n tributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.
Introduction
In the framework of the solution theory for two-person games there are two basic rules, namely the standard solution and the proportional sharing of the surplus. In both, each p l a yer rst gets his own guaranteed payo and then the remaining surplus or overall savings are shared either equally or proportionally to players' initial contributions. Most known values, in particular, the Shapley value 9] and the Banzhaf value 1], are standard for two-person games. Values that appear to be proportional for two-person games are studied less. Among them it is worth mentioning the proper Shapley value of Vorob'ev-Liapunov 1 0 ], the proportional value introduced independently by Ortmann 7] and Feldman 4] , and the weighted entropy solution of Naumova 6 ] . The goal of this paper is to introduce a family of values that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.
Sect. 2 introduces basic de nitions and notation. In Sect. 3, we de ne a family of the semiproportional values. The payo to a player in a game due to the semiproportional value is a weighted sum of relative gains achieved by coalitions containing the player. For any s u c h coalition, its relative gain in comparison to the complementary coalition is determined by t h e proportionality rule applied to the two-person subgame in which the coalition and its complementary one are involved as two individuals in order to divide the overall savings. We p r e s e n t c o nditions on the collection of weights that guarantee the semiproportional value to be proportional for two-person games, e cient, proportionally marginalist, and probabilistic. We also consider some examples of semiproportional values. In Sect. 4 we s h o w that the semiproportional values can be supported by a bilateral probabilistic model. The player set is randomly partitioned into two nonempty complementary coalitions and from each of them a "leader" or "representative" is chosen. The two leaders split the total resources available to all the players playing some chosen two-person game and having in mind the worths of the two coalitions involved, and then each one of them pays, out of his share, a wage to every memb e r o f h i s coalition as speci ed by some a priori given wage vector, and the rest keeps himself. A p a yo vector is considered to be consistent with respect to the probabilistic model if it coincides with the expected payo . We show t h a t f o r e v ery non-negative game with nonzero sum of worths of any t wo complementary coalitions, there exists a unique e cient payo vector consistent with the probabilistic model under the proportional solution for two-person games and it is given by a certain semiproportional value dependent on the probability distributions underlying the probabilistic model. Because of this feature we c hoose the name "semiproportional" for the introduced family of values. The proofs are given in Appendix. 
A v alue is proportional for two-person games if, for any v 2 G f1 2g such t h a t v(1) + v(2) 6 = 0, for every i = 1 2, the surplus is distributed proportionally to the individual worths, that is
or equivalently
Our aim is to introduce a family of values that are proportional for two-person games and satisfy some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, it is tacitly assumed that we consider non-negative games of the class In what follows, by e we denote a unitary simple game in which all nonempty coalitions are winning, i.e., e(S) = 1, for all S N, S 6 = .
Remark. Notice, that for every i 2 N, the weight N (N i ) coincides with the semiproportional payo to the player i in the game e, i.e., for all i 2 N, N (N i ) = S Pr W i (e). If the weights underlying any p l a yer's payo represent a probability distribution for the collection of coalitions containing the player, i.e., for all S N, i 2 S, N (S i) 0, and X S N S3i N (S i) = 1, for all i 2 N, then the semiproportional value is probabilistic. It is worth noting that, for any g a m e v 2 G + N , e v ery probabilistic proportionally marginalist semiproportional value appears to be a probabilistic value 11] with respect to the constant-sum normalization game v c .
Now w e present some conditions on the collection of weights W N to guarantee that the semiproportional value is proportional for two-person games, e cient, or proportionally marginalist. The rst statement g i v es a necessary and su cient condition for the S Pr W -value to be proportional for two-person games. 
and, for all S N, S 6 = N, S 6 = ,
then the semiproportional value is e cient. , for all S N. Moreover, this value can be characterized as a solution of a certain optimization problem which is related to the least square technique. 4 Bilateral probabilistic model
Consider the following bilateral probabilistic model that supports e cient semiproportional values. Suppose that the player set N is to be randomly partitioned into two nonempty coalitions S and NnS and that from each o f t h e s e t wo coalitions a "leader" or "representative" is to be chosen. These two leaders are then to bargain with each other over how t o s p l i t b e t ween the two of them the total resources v(N) available to the n players. Assume that a certain two-person game is chosen, and the two leaders split the amount o f v(N) playing the chosen two-person game and having in mind the worths v(S) and v(NnS) of the two coalitions involved. Then after each one of them pays, out of his share, a wage to every member of his coalition as speci ed by some a priori given wage vector x 2 IR n , and the rest keeps himself. A p a yo vector x 2 IR n is consistent (with respect to the probabilistic model) if it coincides with the expected payo or, which is the same, form a x point of the described probabilistic procedure. The case of standard solution for two-person games for uniform distributions of the partition of the player set N and of the choice of a coalition leader was studied in Evans 3] . He showed that the only consistent p a yo vector under the circumstances is the Shapley value, and therefore he obtained one more characterization of the Shapley value by means of the described model. Later this result was extended by Driessen and Paulusma 2] for arbitrary probability distributions but within the same standard solution for two-person games framework. Our purpose is to study this probabilistic model for the case of proportional solution for two-person games.
Let p(S NnS) 0 denote the probability of the formation of the ordered partition (S NnS) a n d p S i 0 the probability that player i 2 S will be a leader of S, w h e r e S N, S 6 = N, S 6 = , i.e., Moreover, we suppose that both ordered partitions (S NnS) and (NnS S) a r e equally likely, i.e., p(S NnS) = p(NnS S) for all S N S6 = N S6 = .
In this probabilistic framework, the expected payo to player i is equal to
A p a yo vector x 2 IR n is consistent with the probabilistic model if it coincides with the expected payo , i.e., for all i 2 N, x i = E i (v x).
Further, following to 2] which results we rely on, we also suppose some weak symmetry condition that any xed player can be chosen a leader among all coalitions containing his certain xed partner equally likely for all of his possible partners, i.e., for all i 2 N, (12) Remark. It is worth mentioning that under the collection of weights (11) and (12), the associated semiproportional value satis es the su cient e ciency conditions of Proposition 3.3.
When the choice of a size of any nonempty proper coalition is equally likely, and the choice of any nonempty proper coalition among those of the same size is also equally likely, and, moreover, the choice of a leader among all players of any nonempty proper coalition is equally likely as well, the probability distri- If the choice of any ordered pair of proper complementary coalitions is equally likely, and the choice of a leader among all players of any nonempty proper coalition is also equally likely, i.e. if the symmetric probability distributions p(S NnS) = 1 2 n ;2 , for all coalitions S N, S 6 = N, S 6 = , and, for all coalitions S N, S 6 = N, a n d i 2 S, p S i = 1 =s apply, then the conditions (9) { (10) are satis ed, and the semiproportional value of the case (iii) of Example 3.5 arises.
Notice that the Banzhaf type semiproportional value of Example 3.5, being a non-e ective v alue, is not supported by the considered probabilistic model.
Replace now the symmetry condition (10) by a stronger one assuming that for the underlying probability distributions the probability o f a n y player's leadership within a non-empty coalition (with reference to the corresponding ordered partition of the player set) is the same for both the coalition and its complemen- (It is easy to check that symmetry condition (14) is stronger than (10), i.e., under (14), (10) Remark. Observe, that the semiproportional value de ned by the collection of weights (11) { (12) under assumptions (9) and (13) { (14) gives an example of e cient and probabilistic value (with respect to constant-sum normalization game) that is not necessary the random-order one (compare to Theorem 13 in Weber 11] ). This happens because the set of games G +c N does not contain the full class of unanimity games. Because of the proportionality rule, as given by ( 2 ) , w e h a ve:
Hence,
i.e., Moreover, all these weights are non-negative and weights underlying any p l a yer's payo represent a probability distribution for all coalitions containing the player. u t
